We characterize the bipartite stable b-matching polytope in terms of linear constraints. The stable b-matching polytope is the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of stable b-matchings, that is, of stable assignments of a two-sided multiple partner matching model. Our proof uses the comparability theorem of Roth and Sotomayor [13] and follows a similar line as Rothblum did in [14] for the stable matching polytope.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider a well-known generalization of the stable marriage problem of Gale and Shapley [9] . Their stable marriage model consists of finitely many men and women with strict preferences on the possible marriage partners. A stable marriage scheme is a matching of the marriage graph so that no man and woman exists that mutually prefer each other to their eventual marriage partner. Gale and Shapley have proved that the so called deferred acceptance algorithm always finds such a marriage scheme for any preference profiles of the agents. In [9] , Gale and Shapley also considered the stable admissions problem, where one side of the market is a set of colleges, the other side is a set of students. Here again, each agent has a strict preference order on the acceptable members of the other side of the market, moreover each college has a quota for admissible students. In the stable admissions problem, we are looking for a stable market situation, that is, for a set of college-student pairs so that each student is in at most one pair, no college turns up in more pairs than its quota and there exists no college c and student s so that both s and c can improve on their situation if c admits s (and possibly quit other admissions). It turned out 2 that a natural modification of the deferred acceptance algorithm always finds a stable assignment.
Here, we consider the stable b-matching problem, a generalization of the stable admissions problem where each agent in both sides of the market has a quota. We shall give a linear description for the bipartite stable b-matching polytope. Formally, a bipartite preference system is a pair (G, O) where G = (U ∪ V, E) is a finite bipartite graph with bipartition (U, V ), and O = {≤ z : z ∈ U ∪ V } is a family of linear orders, ≤ z being an order on the set D(z) of edges incident with the vertex z. For a quota function b : U ∪ V → N, a stable b-matching of bipartite preference model (G, O) is a subset M of the edge set E such that
any z ∈ U ∪ V , or in other words, M is a b-matching and 2. M is dominating, i.e. any edge e ∈ E outside M has an end node z such that z is incident with b(z) edges of M and for any edge m of M incident with z we have m > z e.
(Here, d M (z) denotes the number of edges of M that is incident with z.) A stable 1-matching is called a stable matching. We denote by P b (G, O) the convex hull of characteristic vectors in R E of stable b-matchings of bipartite preference system (G, O). It is well-known that in any bipartite preference system there exists a stable b-matching and a standard modification of the deferred acceptance algorithm finds one. Actually, it finds an optimal one, that is, any agent of U gets the best partners he can have in a stable stable b-matching and agents of V receive the worst possible partners or vice versa.
The area of stable matchings has become quite popular after the results of Gale and Shapley. From the different generalizations and approaches, we focus on the ones that connect the area to linear programming. Vande Vate seems to be the first who started this direction by giving a linear description of the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of stable matchings in [16] . Theorem 1.1 (Vande Vate '89 [16] ). Let (G, O) be a bipartite preference system with |U | = |V | and E = U × V . Then
Rothblum gave a shorter proof of a modified description for a more general problem in [14] , and his proof was further simplified by Roth et al. in [11] . Theorem 1.2 (Rothblum '92 [14] ). Let (G, O) be a bipartite preference system. Then
Based on these results, standard tools of linear programming allow us to find a maximum weight stable matching in polynomial time. Eventually, a linear programming approach has been developed to the theory of stable matchings by Abeledo, Blum, Roth, Rothblum, Sethuraman, Teo and others (see [3, 4, 1, 2, 11, 15] ).
But these results handle only the stable matching problem and do not say much about stable b-matchings. The following theorem of Baïou and Balinski [5] is an exception as it gives a linear description of the stable admissions polytope and generalizes Theorem 1.2. Theorem 1.3 (Baïou and Balinski '99 [5] ). Let (G, O) be a bipartite preference system and b : U ∪ V → N be a quota function so that b(u) = 1 for all nodes u of U . Then
where a comb is defined for v ∈ V and
Because of the comb constraints, the above characterization can consist of Ω(n B ) linear inequalities, where n is the number of "colleges" and B is the maximum of all quotas. But in spite of the exponential number of constraints, it is still possible to find an optimum weight stable admission by the ellipsoid method, using the separation algorithm of Baïou and Balinski. Note however, that the main significance of Theorem 1.3 lies in the the description of the polytope itself and not in the fact that we can optimize over stable admissions. This is because already Theorem 1.2 is good enough to find a maximum weight stable admissions scheme by the well known node splitting construction described in Lemma 5.6 in [13] . In the node splitted matching model, Rothblum's description characterizes a stable matching polytope P so that the stable admissions polytope is a projection of P . Moreover, the related LP needs only O(n + mB) constraints, where n is the number of agents, m is the number of possible admissions and B is the maximum of the quotas. Note also that the node splitting construction does not seem to be sufficient to optimize over stable b-matchings with Theorem 1.2.
In [8, 6] , Fleiner has described an approach to the theory of stable matchings based on the lattice theoretic fixed point theorem of Tarski. He also proved a generalization of the stable marriage theorem in a matroid model. Further, by using the theory of blocking polyhedra and lattice polyhedra, he gave a linear description of the related matroid-kernel polytope. If this matroid theorem is applied to the special case of the stable b-matching problem then it gives the following linear description of the stable b-matching polytope. Theorem 1.4 (Fleiner 2000 [8, 7] ). Let (G, O) be a bipartite preference system and b : U ∪ V → N be a quota function. Then Note that the constraints in Theorem 1.2 are special cases of the ones in Theorem 1.4. However, there are two important differences between Theorem 1.4 and the above earlier results. A shortage of Fleiner's description is that it uses implicit constraints, hence if it is specialized to the stable marriage problem, it might require more constraints than Rothblum's explicit description. (This is why Theorem 1.4 is rather an extension than a generalization of Theorem 1.2.) A positive feature of Fleiner's result is that unlike Baïou and Balinski, both the matrix and the right hand side vector in the description contains only 0 and 1 entries.
In the next section, we generalize Theorem 1.2 to the stable b-matching polytope. To this end, we use the Comparability Theorem of Roth and Sotomayor [13] and then we follow a similar line as the proof of Rothblum in [14] . The Comparability Theorem states that in a fixed bipartite preference system, if two stable b-matchings are different for some agent, then this agent strictly prefers one b-matching to the other. Theorem 1.5 (Roth and Sotomayor '89 [12] ). Let M and M be two stable bmatchings for bipartite preference system (G, O), let z be a vertex of graph G and
Actually, in [12, 13] Roth and Sotomayor proves the above theorem only in case of the stable admissions problem. Gale includes a sketch of the proof of the general theorem in [10] . For sake of self containedness, we give a short proof of this result. 
The stable b-matching polytope
In this section, we formulate and prove our main result. We shall use an immediate corollary of Theorem 1.5 that seems to be unobserved so far. (1): a characteristic vector is nonnegative; M contains at most one edge of D i (z); and any edge e either belongs to M or it has an end vertex z so that for 1 ≤ k ≤ b(z) each D k (z) will contain an edge m of M with e < z m. Hence the polyhedron described on the right hand side of (1) contains P b (G, O). To justify the opposite containment, we shall decompose a vector x satisfying the right hand side of (1) into a convex combination of characteristic vectors of stable b-matchings. To do this, we need the following lemma. Let x be a vector satisfying the right hand side of (1) and let M consist of the most preferred edges of sets D i (u) ∩ supp(x) for u ∈ U and 1 ≤ i ≤ b(u). Denote amount min{x(m) : m ∈ M } by δ. As x − δχ M has a strictly smaller support than x has, to finish the proof by induction on |supp(x)|, it is enough to show that M is a stable b-matching and that x := 
